TLS Version Reference and Choosing a Secure Cipher Suite

A practical guide to choosing TLS versions and cipher suites: which protocols are secure today, which ciphers should be removed, and what their removal means for older browsers.

6 min Updated 14 Nov 2026

If you run openssl s_client -connect example.com:443 -tls1_1 and the handshake succeeds, it means your server still responds to deprecated protocols. This is the only signal that truly matters: not the grade an online tool gives you, not the green checkmark you see in the hosting panel. A successful handshake on TLS 1.1 means anyone with a simple scanner can see the same thing.

The purpose of this text is exactly what the title says: a reference. The official definition, the exact value, and the decision you need to make. A step-by-step guide to installing a certificate belongs elsewhere.

Which TLS version is acceptable today

There are three versions on the table, and one of them is no longer on the table.

  • TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1 have both been officially deprecated in RFC 8996. Major browsers dropped support for them starting in 2020. If your server only offers these two, the user is faced with the ERR_SSL_VERSION_OR_CIPHER_MISMATCH message.
  • TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246) is still an acceptable standard, but only with the right cipher suites. The protocol itself is secure; the weak combinations within it are not.
  • TLS 1.3 (RFC 8446) was released in 2018 and is today's default choice. It has one practical advantage that is rarely mentioned: in TLS 1.3, weak cipher suites have been removed from the protocol itself, so the possibility of making a configuration mistake is nearly zero.

The configuration line in modern Nginx is this:

ssl_protocols TLSv1.2 TLSv1.3;
ssl_prefer_server_ciphers off;

Note that ssl_prefer_server_ciphers is set to off. In TLS 1.3 this parameter has no effect at all, and in TLS 1.2 setting it to on with the default settings of today's browsers usually produces a worse result. This is where people make mistakes: many set it to on out of habit because that's what old guides said.

Cipher suites: what stays and what goes

In TLS 1.2 you must explicitly state which suites are allowed. If you don't, OpenSSL applies its own default, which depending on the version may include 3DES or RC4.

ssl_ciphers 'ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305';

Three rules behind this list:

  1. Any suite that doesn't have ECDHE doesn't have forward secrecy. That means if the server's private key is leaked tomorrow, all previously recorded traffic can be decrypted.
  2. Set CBC aside. Padding oracle attacks like Lucky13 work against CBC mode. GCM and CHACHA20-POLY1305 don't have this problem.
  3. RC4, 3DES, DES, MD5, and anything with EXPORT in its name are removed without exception.

Order also matters. In TLS 1.2, if the server chooses, the first suite that both sides support wins. Put CHACHA20 first if your server has a processor without AES acceleration; on today's servers with AES-NI the difference is a few percent and not worth debating.

The effect of removing old ciphers on old browsers

This is where you have to make a real decision. Completely removing TLS 1.0 and 1.1 and CBC ciphers means:

ClientStatus after hardening
Chrome 30 and above (2013)No problem
Firefox 27 and above (2014)No problem
Internet Explorer 11 on Windows 7Only with TLS 1.2 enabled in the registry
Java 6 and belowConnection is dropped
Android 4.4 and belowDropped in many cases

If your audience is enterprise and works on Windows 7 with an old IE, full hardening means losing that user. But also consider this: those same clients usually use ciphers that have security problems themselves. In practice, I remove TLS 1.0 and 1.1 entirely, and if necessary, I stand up a separate listener with old settings only for a specific subdomain and with IP restrictions. The main server stays untouched.

This is the cost you have to accept: keeping an old path for compatibility keeps the attack surface open. The right solution is isolation, not generalization.

Checking and monitoring the configuration

After applying the changes, run this command:

openssl s_client -connect example.com:443 -tls1_2 -cipher 'DEFAULT' 2>/dev/null | grep -E 'Protocol|Cipher'

The output should show Protocol : TLSv1.2 and an ECDHE cipher with GCM or CHACHA20. If you see Cipher : AES256-SHA, it means your configuration hasn't been applied and Nginx is still using the default list. Usually the reason is that you put ssl_ciphers in the http block but another value in server overrides it.

To check the certificate chain and common browser errors, the guide Troubleshooting SSL errors in the browser; from incomplete chain to expired certificate covers exactly these cases. If your error is unable to get local issuer certificate, the problem isn't the protocol; it's an incomplete chain.

One point that gets overlooked in monitoring: after every OpenSSL update on the server, the list of supported ciphers changes. Version 3.x has moved some old suites to SECURITY LEVEL 2 and they can no longer be used without explicit configuration. If your configuration depends on a specific cipher, test again after every update.

To check what's visible from the outside, the DNS and network lookup tools can be a good starting point, though for precise cipher analysis there's no substitute for openssl s_client.

Security configuration beyond the protocol

TLS version and cipher suites are only one layer. If you haven't configured security headers, the same site with TLS 1.3 is still vulnerable to browser-side attacks. The guide The complete guide to configuring security headers for a WordPress site covers this layer and complements this discussion.

On the infrastructure side, if attack traffic reaches the server, no TLS configuration will save you. DDoS protection is a layer that must be solved before discussing encryption. For services that seriously invest in transport layer security, ServerNet security services is an option you can look into.

And if you want to know when configuration changes are applied to the service, real-time service status is a more up-to-date reference than notification emails.

Frequently asked questions

Is TLS 1.2 still secure?

Yes, provided you've restricted the allowed cipher suites. The TLS 1.2 protocol itself has no known design vulnerabilities; the problem comes from weak combinations that remain enabled by default. If you allow ECDHE with GCM or CHACHA20 and close the rest, TLS 1.2 is sufficient for most use cases.

The main difference from TLS 1.3 is performance, not just security. TLS 1.3 uses one fewer round-trip for the handshake, which is noticeable on high-latency connections.

Why do some users get errors after disabling TLS 1.0?

Because their client doesn't support TLS 1.2. This usually means Windows 7 without updates, or an old library in an internal enterprise application. The browser error is ERR_SSL_VERSION_OR_CIPHER_MISMATCH and nothing is logged on the server side either, because the handshake fails before reaching the HTTP layer.

The right solution is updating the client. If that's not possible, create a separate listener on another port with old settings restricted to that user's IP.

Should I turn on ssl_prefer_server_ciphers?

No. In TLS 1.3 this parameter is ignored, and in TLS 1.2 with today's browsers, client selection usually achieves a better result because the client knows which cipher its hardware executes faster. Set it to off unless you have a specific reason to do otherwise.

How do I find out which ciphers my server offers?

With nmap --script ssl-enum-ciphers -p 443 example.com you get the full list. To quickly check a specific cipher, openssl s_client -cipher 'cipher name' -connect example.com:443 is enough. If the handshake succeeds, that cipher is enabled.

One last point: TLS configuration isn't a one-time task. Every OpenSSL update, every change in browser policies, and every new certificate can change the result. Set up a monthly automated test using the same openssl s_client command and save the output somewhere you can spot the difference.

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